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Transparency in Federal Antitrust
Enforcement Decisions:
A Reaction to Professor Grimes
JOHN M. NANNESt
Professor Grimes has prepared a very thoughtful
Article regarding transparency in federal antitrust decisionmaking. Bob Pitofsky has responded based on his
experiences at the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), and
I offer some observations based on my experiences at the
Antitrust Division ("Division"). Some of the issues that
Professor Grimes raises are common to both of the federal
antitrust enforcement agencies, but others, such as
procedures and practices arising out of the Tunney Act,
apply only to the Division. I will address both.
I. TRANSPARENCY ISSUES COMMON TO BOTH AGENCIES

Transparency in federal antitrust decision-making is a
laudable objective. Transparency contributes to reasoned
decision-making, consistency, predictability, and fairness.
When the Division or the FTC files a case and litigates it to
conclusion, the agency's position is a matter of public
record. However, when the agency decides not to file a case
or settles a case that has been filed, the rationale for doing
so often is not disclosed.
But the concept of "transparency" is not self-defining
and can, indeed, have many meanings. It can refer, for
example, to enforcement standards and procedures. How
are decisions made by the agencies? What is the analytical
framework that the agencies apply to decision-making? Or,
transparency can refer to the reasons for specific

t Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP; formerly Acting
Assistant Attorney General (2001) and Deputy Assistant Attorney General
(1998-2001), Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice.
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enforcement decisions. What particular factors, among the
many that the agencies consider, were determinative in a
specific matter? Does the enforcement decision reflect
straight-forward application of generally applicable
standards, or were there special factors considered in a
particular instance?
Furthermore, transparency can be achieved in many
ways, even with respect to merger enforcement that is the
principal focus of Professor Grimes's Article. He strongly
advocates that the agencies do more to explain decisions
when enforcement actions are not brought or are settled.
There are, however, various ways for communicating the
rationale for such decisions. The Division and the FTC have
issued written guidelines that remain a good statement of
the analytical framework used to review mergers. In
addition, Division and FTC officials often give speeches
explaining enforcement policies. And finally, senior officials
of the agencies appear frequently before various
congressional committees to explain agency enforcement
policies.
But, if transparency is a laudable objective, it is not
costless to achieve. There are various costs that would flow
from a decision by the agencies to provide the kind of
reports, decisions, or explanations that Professor Grimes
urges. While his Article purports to acknowledge these
costs, I am left with the feeling that he has undervalued
them.
The transparency issues that Professor Grimes raises
have similar implications for both the Division and the
FTC. There are, to be sure, differences between the
agencies. The Division is a component of the executive
branch and has long regarded itself as a law enforcement
agency. Unlike the FTC (as well as many of the other
agencies cited by Professor Grimes, such as the FCC and
FERC), which investigates, adjudicates, and issues orders,
the Division can neither adjudicate nor issue orders in its
own right. Instead, when the Division issues a complaint, it
must be prepared to go to court to obtain relief.
With respect to merger enforcement, however, there are
substantial similarities between the agencies. Both
investigate mergers. Both may challenge mergers and
either may settle those challenges or have them
adjudicated. And both agencies may close investigations
without taking enforcement action. While Professor Grimes
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purports to find that the FTC is substantially more
forthcoming in providing information about antitrust
enforcement decisions, the basis for this assessment is
explainable by a single difference in agency practice that he
himself recognizes offers some public benefits.1
Professor Grimes acknowledges four "costs" of
transparency: (1) resources; (2) confidentiality; (3) creation
of precedent that would undermine future cases; and (4)
awkwardness or difficulty of explaining decisions that are
based on administrative or "mixed" reasons.
A. Resources
It is easy to dismiss argu ments based on resource
constraints-most of us have likely said to someone at one
time or another: "If you thought it was important enough
you would have found time to do *it"-butthey are very real.
While Professor Grimes focuses on the Division's merger
enforcement program, the Division has a substantial civil
criminal
an aggressive
and
non-merger program
merger
compete with
that
program
enforcement
enforcement for resources. Deal work has been down for the
past few years, and thresholds under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 ("HSR"), as amended,
have been raised. It was not too long ago that there were
over 5,000 HSR filings annually, a number that has
recently declined to less than 2,000. However, if history is
any guide, this will be a temporary lull, which means that
1. Professor Grimes finds that the FTC provided "minimally adequate"
disclosure in fifty-six percent of merger cases, whereas the Division provided
such disclosure in only twenty-one percent of such cases. Warren S. Grimes,
Transparencyin FederalAntitrust Enforcement, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 967, 971
(2003). The difference is found in the agencies' different treatment of "fix-itfirst" resolutions. There are frequently circumstances in which parties,
recognizing that a proposed merger raises competitive issues, undertake to
"cure" the problem themselves, without awaiting conclusion of an investigation.
The FTC generally requires the parties to enter into consent decrees in such
circumstances (under threat of an administrative enforcement action if the
parties refuse). The Division's practice has generally been to allow the parties to
proceed with a restructured transaction without filing a complaint and consent
decree, and Professor Grimes acknowledges that there is "much to commend"
this approach. Grimes, supra, at 981. If the comparison between agencies is
adjusted to eliminate the disparate treatment of "fix-it-first" resolutions, then it
appears that they are making "minimally adequate" disclosures in roughly the
same percentage of matters (fifty-six percent for the FTC and fifty percent for
the Division).
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fundamental
changes
in
agency
decision-making
implemented at this time should be considered in a context
of limited agency resources.
Obviously, a proposal to issue "non-enforcement"
explanations will have resource implications for career
staff. Consider, too, the implications of what Professor
Grimes proposes with respect to senior officials at the
Division. Today, when the Division files a case, the
complaint is signed by the Assistant Attorney General
("AAG"), and the AAG is personally involved in the decision
to bring that case. To a limited extent-that I will address
later-the Division provides an explanation for settlements
of civil cases, but settlements, by their very nature, are not
intended to establish precedent for subsequent enforcement
actions. However, Professor Grimes's proposal goes beyond
urging greater elaboration of statements accompanying
settlements and would include, in addition, statements
regarding enforcement actions that are not brought by the
Division, including a "detailed explanation" whenever a
second request has been issued.
For those statements to be meaningful, in the way that
Professor Grimes intends, they, no less than decisions to file
complaints, must represent the personal thinking of the
AAG. Under his proposal, the Division would have had to
issue 228 such decisions (dropped investigations plus
abandoned mergers plus fix-it-first resolutions) over the
last four years. That is more than one a week. The impact
upon the AAG and his or her senior advisors would be a
substantial one, indeed.
B. Confidentiality
I was at the Division in the 1970s and was very
involved personally in the legislative battle surrounding
HSR. Confidentiality assurances played an important part
in passage of HSR. Under existing practice today,
companies do not have to worry about disclosure of
confidential business information when they respond to a
second request. With broad confidentiality assured,
companies responding to a second request do not look for
ways to circumscribe production; close calls are resolved in
favor of production. It is one thing to say that an agency
may use a company's documents against the company if a
transaction is challenged; that is simply the risk that comes
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from proposing a merger. But it seems to be a different
matter to say that an agency can disclose a company's
confidential information when the agency has concluded
that a merger does not violate the law.
Third parties also often value confidentiality,
sometimes more than the merging parties. Often third
parties-customers, suppliers, or small competitors-may
fear retaliation. They realize that their information may be
disclosed if the agency decides to challenge a merger, but if
they believe that their information may be disclosed even if
the agency does not challenge the transaction, it may
discourage them from coming forward in the first place.
That having been said, this is certainly an area in
which the Division could exhibit considerable care through
the exercise of discretion. In the instances in which the
agencies have issued explanations of decisions not to take
enforcement action, those explanations have generally not
disclosed the kinds of information-marketing plans, future
product plans-that are most sensitive to the business
community.
C. Creation of Precedent that Would Undermine Future
Cases
If the Division issued decisions explaining nonenforcement decisions, there is no reason to believe that the
defendants in litigated merger cases would not seek to use
those statements against the agencies. Here, we do have
some experience. Those of you who were around twenty
years ago may recall that the 1984 merger guidelines spoke
very broadly about the role of entry in the agencies'
analysis of proposed mergers. The guidelines were intended
to provide guidance regarding the analytical framework
that the agencies would bring to the task of merger review
and an enumeration of factors that they would consider in
the process. A number of subsequent court decisions cited to
the discussion in the guidelines regarding ease of entry and
used those statements to support decisions permitting
mergers to proceed.! This was one of the factors that caused
the agencies to revise the merger guidelines in 1992 to
clarify the standards for entry; the clarifications did not
2. See United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982-83 (2d Cir.
1984).
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materially affect how the agencies performed their review,
and were intended largely for judicial consumption.
The argument can be made, of course, that this is how
the process should work. If an agency statement of
enforcement rationale is not precise or is construed outside
the agencies in a manner not intended by the agencies, then
the proper course may be to revise the guidelines as
necessary. However, the context in which this issue arises
under Professor Grimes's proposal is that the agencies will
be writing dozens, if not hundreds, of statements explaining
decisions for not challenging particular mergers. This will
put inevitable pressure on the agencies to write statements
in such a manner that they cannot be "used against them"
at a later time. To the extent that the agencies accede to
this natural inclination, this will reduce the value of such
statements substantially. A pattern of "cookie-cutter"
explanations would do little to advance the interests in
transparency and yet may be the inevitable outcome.
Indeed, as Professor Grimes and others have argued, a
similar tendency has been observed in the context of the
Tunney Act, about which more will be said later.
D. Difficulty of ExplainingDecisions Based on
Administrative or "Mixed"Results
Professor Grimes acknowledges a fourth sort of catchall argument against transparency: that some decisions not
to pursue enforcement reflect factors other than a
determination that the merger is lawful or harmless. Let us
leave aside two examples he cites-the "priority"
assessment is usually made at the outset of an
investigation rather than at its conclusion and staff
"mistakes" have not motivated enforcement decisions, at
least in my experience. But the recognition that
enforcement decisions reflect a "mix" of factors is certainly
true, and it greatly complicates the analysis.
The suggestion that the agencies issue decisions
regarding non-enforcement decisions proceeds, in my view,
from a simplified view of factors that actually go into
antitrust decision-making. These factors arise both initially
and subsequently in the course of an investigation. With
respect to a merger, for example, there are times when the
issuance of a second request does not reflect an affirmative
judgment that competitive issues are significant, but rather
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only that staff has some issues of concern that it has not
been able to resolve within the initial waiting period. Thus,
there are circumstances in which the agency issues a
second request when neither the agency nor the parties
expect full compliance. Instead, the agency identifies
potentially dispositive issues that the parties seek to
address at the outset. Yet, under Professor Grimes's
proposal, the issuance of a second request would become the
triggering mechanism for the obligation to issue an
explanatory decision.
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, there are often
many factors that go into a decision to sue or not to sue,
especially in close cases. The suggestion that there is a
single rationale for a decision that can be easily
encapsulated in an explanatory statement does not comport
with the realities of the decision-making process. Often, the
decision to bring or not bring an action reflects not the
inquiry "Is the merger 'lawful or harmless'?" but, rather, "If
we think this merger is unlawful and harmful, can we prove
it in court?" Consider the following factors that could affect
such an inquiry:
1. Evidentiary limitations. There are times when the
agency believes that a transaction will violate the law, but
the agency is unable to identify witnesses who will come
forward and testify. Such reluctance need not necessarily
reflect witness concerns about potential retaliation by the
merging parties (although it may), but may simply reflect
corporate policies not to participate in such litigation or
practical assessments that the nature of the competitive
harm to a particular entity is not sufficiently substantial to
warrant the time and expense associated with actively
participating to oppose it (although the agency believes
harm to all affected entities would be sufficiently
substantial to warrant an enforcement action).
2. Multiple reasons. There are often circumstances in
which a non-enforcement decision represents a confluence
of different rationales that both point in the same direction.
For example, there may be circumstances in which the
competitive case is marginal, but might warrant being
brought in certain circumstances, except the agency
concludes that an enforcement action is not warranted
because of financial difficulties facing the acquired
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company. Even if the financial difficulties would not meet
the criteria of the failing company doctrine, the combination
of a marginal case and financial difficulties might tip the
scale against an enforcement action.
3. Bad facts to test a principle of law. Occasionally, an
agency may believe that a transaction raises an important
principle of law that should be tested, but that the facts are
such that it may be difficult to prevail or difficult to get the
issue ripe for decision. Thus, the decision not to challenge a
particular transaction should not be taken as an indication
that other transactions that raise similar issues would not
be challenged in the future.
Thus, any particular non-enforcement decision may
reflect many different factors. Importantly, too, certain of
the factors may weigh more heavily for different members
of the staff and senior officials at the agency. The
suggestion that this could all be boiled down into a simple
explanatory statement is just not realistic.
For these reasons, I am left with the feeling that a
mandatory rule of the kind Professor Grimes suggests
would be too burdensome. However, the suggestion that the
Division should consider statements in cases that present
issues of particular importance is a good one and should be
considered in appropriate circumstances. When Bob
Pitofsky and I were discussing Professor Grimes's Article,
he reminded me of an instance he was aware of some time
ago when Tom Kauper, who was AAG in the mid-1970s,
issued a lengthy memorandum explaining why he had
decided to drop a shared-monopoly case against tire
manufacturers, even though the government had survived a
motion for summary judgment. I was actually able to offer
some context for that memorandum, since I was serving as
a special assistant to Tom Kauper at the time.
In the environment of the times-the Division was still
recovering from the IT&T scandal-Tom Kauper decided to
explain his decision in a memorandum to the Attorney
General, to release the memorandum to the press, and to
brief Senator Phil Hart and Representative Peter Rodino,
who at the time were chairmen of the relevant committees
in both houses of Congress. There was barely a ripple in the
press or on the Hill. Transparency worked.
But if the process demonstrates the benefits of
transparency, it
also demonstrates
the costs of
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transparency. The AAG literally spent weeks reading staff
memoranda, reviewing the trial record, and meeting with
staff lawyers and economists to review the case. Once he
had made up his mind, he worked on the explanatory
memorandum. It turned out that this was one instance
when explaining a "non-enforcement" decision was exactly
the correct thing to do. But the principle it demonstrates is
not that such a process is appropriate all the time; rather, it
is an important option that is available and should be
utilized 3with respect to matters of important competitive
interest.
II. THE TUNNEY ACT
Professor Grimes also addresses the Tunney Act. I
think it is fair to say that he thinks the Act has not been
reasonably construed and applied. Here, again, I think a
little history may be instructive.
The Tunney Act was a response to a specific series of
events: the connection between a contribution by IT&T to
help finance the 1972 Republican Convention in San Diego
and a decision by the Division to accept a settlement with
IT&T in lieu of appealing a decision challenging IT&T's
acquisition of the Hartford Insurance Company to the
Supreme Court.
The provisions of the Act dealing with consent decrees
required disclosure of contacts by a defendant with the
government, submission of a competitive impact statement
("CIS"), opportunity for public comment, and a judicial
finding that the decree is in the public interest. The
3. It is interesting to note that recently the Division issued an explanatory
statement in connection with the closing of the investigation into Orbitz. See
Statement by Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate, Department of
Justice, Regarding the Closing of the Orbitz Investigation (July 31, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2O03/201208.htm.
This was an antitrust investigation into a joint venture among airlines to
provide electronic ticketing services that competed with independent electronic
ticketing services and traditional travel agents. It was also a matter in which
the Department of Transportation had issued various orders and statements.
Importantly, the statement issued by the Division identified the competitive
concerns presented by the venture: whether the joint venture would facilitate
coordination among the airlines or diminish incentives to discount fares and
whether the joint venture would make Orbitz dominant in online air travel
distribution. This indicates that the current leadership of the Division
recognizes the benefits of transparency.
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Division opposed the bill, fearing that it would interfere
with the settlement process in antitrust cases, lead to
protracted evidentiary hearings, and encroach on the
separation of powers. As we approach the thirtieth
anniversary of the Act, what do we find?
The Act seems to have worked well in addressing the
principal concern that prompted it: discouraging political
interference. There have been very few claims that I know
of that the merger review process has become politicized in
anything remotely approaching the sense that gave rise to
the Act. Indeed, for many years the culture of
"independence" fostered by the Act has, as a practical
matter, erected a wall between the White House and the
Division that is virtually unique in the executive branch.
Beyond that, however, it seems that no one is happy with
the Act.
The Division does not seem fully satisfied with the Act.
It imposes substantial costs, not only in terms of resourcesit takes time to prepare the CIS, even more time to respond
to public comment, and the Federal Register and other
notice costs can be quite significant. I have seen cases in
which commentators have submitted prior works, such as
lengthy law review articles or congressional testimony, in
the guise of comments to a decree, and the Department has
had to publish them in the Federal Register and to respond
to them.
Third parties do not seem fully satisfied, either. They
are frustrated by judicial decisions that limit the scope of
judicial review under the Tunney Act. The concerns they
express most often go to the heart of prosecutorial
discretion: claims that the government chose not to bring
and forms of relief that the government chose not to seek.
The 1995 Microsoft case rejected inquiries into these areas,
relying not only upon statutory construction but also upon
constitutional concerns relating to separation of powers.'
4. In reviewing the Division's testimony on the bill, I was surprised to find
that, as a matter of course before the Tunney Act, the Division's policy was to
enter into stipulations with defendants to defer entry of a decree for thirty days,
to issue a simultaneous press release inviting comments of interested parties,
and to reserve the right to withdraw its consent at any time during that period.
I was struck with how similar that process is to the current process utilized at
the FTC.
5. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per
curiam).
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Even judges are beginning to scratch their heads. In
United States v. Pearsonplc, 6 Judge Robertson mused when
he found himself reviewing a decree in which the core
transaction among the merging parties had long been
consummated and Pearson had already sold the assets
covered by the decree-all before Tunney Act approval.
After reviewing applicable court decisions, he concluded
that the public interest inquiry "is so limited in scope as to
be very nearly a ministerial act."7
The time would seem ripe for a re-examination of the
Tunney Act, without any preconceptions about the need or
direction of any amendments. The pending appeal in the
Microsoft monopolization case may provide an occasion for
judicial examination of the Act (albeit not in the context of
merger review). Now that the American Antitrust Institute
has had a conference on transparency in antitrust decisionmaking, perhaps the next item on its agenda could be a
conference on the Tunney Act.

6. 55 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 1999) (mem.).
7. Id. at 45.

